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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT C. LARSON,

:

Plaintiff-Appellant,

:

Case No. 920711-CA

vs.

:

Oral Argument
Priority 15

PPG INDUSTRIES, INC., a
Pennsylvania corporation;
DIAMOND SHAMROCK CHEMICALS
COMPANY, a Delaware
corporation; et al.,

:

Defendants-Appellees.

:

:
:

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Larson does not claim that any constitutional provisions,
statutes, or rules are determinative of the issues on appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of facts
Larson objects to PPG Industries7, Inc. ("PPG") statement of
uncontroverted facts as they are not presented in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff.
104, 107

(Utah 1991).

Wineaar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d

Further, PPG cites to fact which are

irrelevant and have no purpose other than improperly swaying the
Court's decision.

The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states

that the statement of the case shall include "[a] statement of the
facts relevant to the issues presented for review. . . . "

Utah R.

App. P. 24(a)(7).
PPG in its statement of facts refers to the availability of
the purifying respirator and rubber gloves available to workers,

PPG further refers to a washroom in the work area. These facts are
not relevant to the issues before this court and should not be
considered for purposes of this appeal.
PPG alleges in their statement of uncontroverted facts that
plaintiff does not trust doctors.
this statement.

The depositions do not support

The deposition statements state that plaintiff

does not like to go to hospitals because he becomes nauseated and
because plaintiff had not previously required treatment by doctors.
(R. 1542-43)
PPG asserts that plaintiff did not consider these matters
serious.

The depositions do not support this statement.

Deposi-

tions support a finding that plaintiff was concerned about his
symptoms, but did not see a doctor unless it was incapacitating.
(R. 1540)
PPG alleges that witnesses have disappeared, memories have
faded,

that

it

is virtually

impossible

to determine whether

symptoms are caused by TCE, that evidence has been lost, that it is
impossible or nearly impossible to determine whether Black & Decker
used the vapor degreaser appropriately and whether the employees
followed policy. These statements are self-serving, conclusory and
are arguments inappropriate in a statement of uncontroverted facts
and should not be considered in the Court's determination.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISCOVERY RULE IS APPLICABLE
TO HAZARDOUS MATERIAL PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES.
Application

of the discovery rule to cases of products

liability is appropriate where discovery of the cause of injury
could not reasonably have been known by plaintiff.

In cases where

the discovery rule is not applied by statute or where there is no
concealment by defendant, the test for applying the discovery rule
is whether "application of the general statute of limitation rule
would be irrational or unjust." Klinaer v. Rightly. 791 P.2d 868,
872 (Utah 1990).
PPG alleges in Point I of its brief that the discovery rule of
the statute of limitations does not apply to products liability
cases.

PPG further asserts that the discovery rule should only

apply in cases involving a claim of professional malpractice where
there is reliance or trust.

The Utah Supreme Court, however, has

not limited application of the discovery rule to professional
malpractice cases.

See Allen v. Ortiz, 802 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1990)

(applying the discovery rule to a libel action); Myers v. McDonald.
635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981) (applying the discovery rule to a
wrongful death action).

Further, contrary to PPG's assertions, it

is proper to look to other states to see whether application of the
discovery rule is appropriate in a products liability case.

See

Allen v. Ortiz, 802 P.2d at 1313 (review of other states' applica-
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tion of discovery rule to defamation cases) ; see also Brief of
Appellant, pp. 11-14.
The Supreme Court has held that application of the discovery
rule is appropriate in cases where there are special circumstances
justifying tolling the limitation.

In Allen v. Ortizf the court

stated, "[p]otential plaintiffs should not be barred from suit if
they did not know and could not reasonably have known of the facts
giving rise to a cause of action . . . ." Allen, 802 P. 2d at 131314.
In cases where the injury or cause of the injury is difficult
or impossible for the plaintiff to discover, application of the
discovery rule is appropriate.

Id. The cause of action for libel

in Allen did not begin to run until the libel was known or could
have been discovered through reasonable diligence.

Id.

at 1314.

It is irrational and unjust to apply the general statute of
limitations in a hazardous material exposure case where it is
difficult or impossible to discover the cause of the injury until
several years after the injury originally occurred. The discovery
rule is therefore necessary to avoid injustice.
Discovery of the cause of injury is an appropriate date at
which to apply the statute of limitations.

The court in Foil v.

Balinqer, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979), held that where there was a
lack of knowledge as to the cause of plaintiff's suffering until
years after the injury occurred, the claim was not defeated by the
statute of limitations.

The court stated, "[w]e see no basis for

4

making a legal distinction between having no knowledge of an
injury, as was the case in Christiansen, and no knowledge that a
known injury was caused by unknown negligence."

Id. at 148. The

court applied

the statute of

the discovery

rule and tolled

limitations until plaintiff knew the cause of his injuries.
Because
material

application

exposure

cases

of

the discovery

rule

is

necessary

prevent

to

in hazardous
injustice,

application of the discovery rule is appropriate in this products
liability case.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF NEED ONLY SHOW LACK OF ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE
OR THAT A REASONABLE PERSON WOULD NOT HAVE
KNOWN OF THE CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES.
PPG alleges that plaintiff must make a showing

of due

diligence to discover the injuries and causes of the injuries
before application of the discovery rule will apply. However, the
standard that PPG urges this court to adopt goes beyond that which
is required by the Utah Supreme Court. In Klinaer v. Rightly. 791
P.2d at 872, the Utah Supreme Court applied the discovery rule but
did not find that the plaintiff must show due diligence in
discovering the cause of injuries.

The court instead looked at

whether there was actual knowledge by the plaintiff of the cause of
injury.

The court in Klinaer found that there was no reason for

plaintiffs to suspect that they had been injured.

"They had no

reason to suspect that the survey was inaccurate, nor did they
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refrain

from doing

anything that might reasonably

expected of them that could have disclosed the error."

have been
Id.

Just as in the Klinaer case, Mr. Larson in this case did not
have reason to suspect that TCE was the cause of his abnormal
collection of symptoms.

He did not affirmatively refrain from

seeking medical help, but did make some inquiry of his family
physician.

None of the symptoms by itself was of sufficient

gravity to demand that he seek further medical help, and there is
no evidence to indicate that he should have believed the symptoms
were related.

Because there was no actual knowledge of the cause

of his injuries, Mr. Larson could not be expected to have filed a
lawsuit during the four-year period after his injuries.

Such

knowledge is not within the scope of an ordinary lay person.
PPG cites to O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d
1139 (Utah 1991), and Warren v. Provo City Corp.. 838 P.2d 1125
(Utah 1992) , for the proposition that there is an affirmative duty
of due diligence upon plaintiff to show that he could not have
known the cause of his injuries.

However, 0/Neal did not require

a showing of due diligence, but granted summary judgement on the
basis that plaintiff had actual knowledge of the cause of his
injuries. This knowledge precluded him from applying the discovery
rule. O'Neal involved a minor who was an alleged victim of sexual
abuse who

sued

negligence.

the Division

of Family

Services

for alleged

The court stated:

In the present case, O'Neal contends that his
case presents exceptional circumstances be6

cause although he knew the facts underlying
his cause of action, he was psychologically
unable to reveal them, much less to pursue his
legal remedies. The difficulty with O'Neal's
argument is that it seeks to have us apply the
balancing analysis suggested by the Myers case
without first focusing on the prerequisite to
any application of the discovery rule—ignorance by the plaintiff of the facts giving
rise to the cause of action.
O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d at 1144 (emphasis
added).

Thus, O'Neal does not require plaintiff to show due

diligence in finding the cause of injury, but merely denies
application of the discovery rule unless there was "ignorance by
the plaintiff of the facts giving rise to the cause of action."
Id.
The court in Warren v. Provo City Corp., reviewed whether the
failure to obtain

information

from

Provo City

regarding the

maintenance of a plane involved in a crash justified application of
the discovery rule. However, Warren differs in that the plaintiff
in Warren was also not ignorant of the facts giving rise to the
cause of action.

The Warren court stated:

The fact that the plane crashed gave Warren
reasonable grounds to question whether Provo
was enforcing Ordinance 13.03.060 in requiring
Western Flyers to keep its airplanes in airworthy condition. Furthermore, the fact that
Warren's counsel phoned Provo City Airport in
June of 1989 indicates that Warren knew of the
requirements of Ordinance 13.03.060 well
within the one-year period. However. though
Warren knew of the ordinance and should have
been on notice that the ordinance may not have
been enforced, the only inguiry he undertook
was to make an unspecified number of phone
calls to Provo City Airport.
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Warren v, Provo City Corp,f 838 P.2d at 1129 (emphasis added).
Thus# due to the plaintiff's knowledge of the injury and possible
violations in Warren, the court denied application of the discovery
rule based on the special circumstances exception.
In this case there is no indication that plaintiff knew of the
cause of injuries until watching the television program regarding
TCE in the fall of 1984. Nor could plaintiff reasonably have known
of the harmful effects of TCE as those effects were not within
common knowledge until 1984.

Even if there were a requirement of

due diligence to discover the cause of injuries, the evidence
viewed

in a light most favorable to the plaintiff

indicates

plaintiff has met that burden in attempting to question his
physicians about the causes of his seemingly unrelated symptoms and
in immediately visiting his physician upon actual knowledge of the
harmful effects of TCE.
POINT III
THE DISCOVERY RULE IS WARRANTED IN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY CASES WHERE THE CAUSE OF THE INJURIES
MAY NOT BE LEARNED UNTIL YEARS AFTER EXPOSURE.
PPG alleges that even if it were proper to apply the discovery
rule in a products liability action, the plaintiff has failed to
show

exceptional

discovery rule.

circumstances

requiring

application

of

the

However, the discovery rule is appropriate in

cases where the causes of the injuries may not be learned until
years after the exposure. See Appellant Brief, pp. 9-14. Further,
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the court in Klinaer v. Kiahtlv stated after reviewing the reasons
for applying the discovery rule,
[w]e held that the discovery rule should be
applied where "[t]he hardship of the statute
of limitations would impose on the plaintiff
in the circumstances of [the] case outweighed
any prejudice to the defendant from difficulties of proof caused by the passage of time."
This balancing test is a question of law.
Klinger v. Kicrhtley, 791 P.2d at 873 (quoting Myers v. McDonald,
635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981)).
The court

in Klinaer went on to hold the prejudice to

plaintiff from being completely barred outweighed the prejudice to
defendant occasioned by the passage of fourteen years7 of time such
that "presumably, the memories of the members of the survey party
have dimmed."

Klinger, 791 P.2d at 872.

Applying the balancing test to this case, application of the
discovery rule is appropriate.

Application of the statute of

limitations to a plaintiff who could not reasonably have known at
the time his symptoms had manifested themselves that his injuries
were caused

by contact with TCE is unjust

and requires the

application of the discovery rule. Further, although memories may
have faded with the passage of time, witnesses are still available
to testify in behalf of both the plaintiff and the defendant.

The

burden of proof is on the plaintiff who bears the difficulty of
proving the cause of action.

The court in Mvers v. McDonald

stated:
Defendant cannot establish that he was prejudiced by having to defend a stale claim
9

since his problems of proof occasioned by the
delay are no greater than the plaintiffs. In
contrast, plaintiffs could not file an action
for damages or even initiate investigative
efforts to determine the cause of death of
which they had no knowledge.
Myers. 635 P.2d at 87.
Application of the discovery rule is appropriate in cases
where the causes of the injuries may not be learned until years
after the exposure. The prejudice against plaintiff far outweighs
the difficulties of proof caused by the passage of time.
POINT IV
CAUSATION IS AN ISSUE PROPERLY DETERMINED
BY THE TRIER OF FACT.
PPG improperly raises an issue not previously raised in its
motion for summary judgment. Defendant alleges that plaintiff has
not

adduced

sufficient

evidence

injuries by the chemical TCE.

of

causation

of

plaintiff's

PPG cites to Reeves v. Geiav

Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 640 (Utah App. 1988), for the
proposition that expert affidavits must be submitted to show
causation of the injury; however, defendant raises this issue
inappropriately, as it was not raised by defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment (R. 300-302) and is now raised for the first time
on appeal.
Unless special circumstances can be shown warranting the
failure to raise an issue prior to appeal, courts have generally
held that issues may not be raised for the first time on appeal.
Warren v. Provo Citv Corp. 838 P.2d at 1128 n.4; Sharp v. Ros10

kelley. 818 P.2d 4, 7 (Utah 1991); Standard Federal Savings & Loan
Assn. v, Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136, 1139 (Utah 1991).
Even assuming this issue were appropriate for appeal, this
issue should be determined

by the trier of fact.

Further,

plaintiff has provided substantial evidence indicating that TCE was
the cause of his injuries. The court in Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical. Inc.. 764 P.2d at 640, states:
Appellant contends that, even without opposing
affidavits, the record before the trial court
demonstrated a genuine issue of disputed
material fact to be resolved by the factfinder, namely, whether his injuries were
caused by the drugs. We agree.
Id.

(emphasis added).

Thus, the court in Reeves did not require

expert affidavits, but stated that the record was sufficient to
show that this was a disputed issue of fact which would be more
appropriately determined by the factfinder.
Defendant further relies on King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals,
832 P.2d 858, 864 (Utah 1992), where there was a question of
whether a spontaneous abortion was caused by an intrauterine device
or whether it was caused by negligence in the implantation by the
doctor. The Supreme Court found that there was a material issue of
fact as to causation and stated, M[w]e are guided by the general
judicial policy that favors a trial on the merits when there is
some doubt as to the propriety of the summary judgment."
864-65.

The court further stated,

Id. at

fl

[i]n sum, we held that Searle

has not demonstrated the absence of a material issue of fact as to
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whether the Cu-7 was the cause of plaintiff's injury." Id. at 865
(emphasis added).
Plaintiff

need

not

further

substantiate

his

claims

of

causation by expert affidavits, where defendant has failed to show
the absence of a material issue of fact.

Further, in this case,

just as in the Reeves case, the depositions do provide evidence
that the TCE was the cause of plaintiff's injuries.

(R. 566-68,

570-74, 580, 813-15, 861-82, 1000-04, 1018-19, 1083-1086, 1145-46,
1465-74, 1520, 1528, 1549-52, 1567-69, 1574-77).
Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985),
differs from the present case in that there was an intervening
cause of death by a burglar or a friend of the victim, and there
was no indication of forced entry or use of a pass key. Thus, the
court found that causation had not been shown in any form and that
the causation of the victim's death was pure speculation.

This is

further apparent from the court's citation to Staheli v. Farmers'
Cooperative of Southern Utah, 655 P.2d 680 (Utah 1982), which
involved a fire in a shared storage facility of grain.

The court

found that the possibilities of the cause of the fire were so
numerous as to be "unlimited in scope."

Id. at 682.

Plaintiff, through depositions, has shown a link of TCE to the
cause of his injuries.

Where, as in this case, there has been a

direct link to the cause of injuries, there is enough to raise a
factual issue for a jury to make a determination.
at 864-65; Reeves, 764 P.2d at 640.
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King, 832 P.2d

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff did not know and could not reasonably have known TCE
caused his injuries. The statute of limitations did not run under
the doctrine of the discovery rule prior to the filing of plaintiff's complaint.
support

The facts presented to the trial court would

a finding

that the defendant

caused

the plaintiff's

injuries and is liable under products liability and negligence
theories. Summary judgment was improper, and the dismissal should
be reversed.
DATED this

// &

day of August, 1993.

LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: /
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellant
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